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Anti-competitive behavior is a concern for economists since, if occurs, it is detrimental for the 
performance of market institutions in terms of both social efficiency and auctioneer’s revenue. 
Traditionally, experimentalists investigated possibilities of anti-competitive behavior in (1) two-
sided auction markets trading multiple units and (2) single-unit one-sided auctions (see Holt 
(1995) and Kagel (1995) for reviews, and also Cason’s chapter in this volume). A number of 
recent experimental studies turned to one-sided multi-unit auctions. The interest is generated by 
both theoretical developments in auction theory, and by the growing use of multi-unit auction 
mechanisms in practice, such as government procurement and privatization programs and 
internet auctions. 
 
Two frequently discussed kinds of anti-competitive behavior in multi-object auction markets are 
demand reduction and bidder collusion. Although the two are closely interrelated, distinction is 
often made along the following lines. Demand reduction occurs due to monopsony power of a 
buyer demanding multiple units of a homogeneous good in a uniform price auction. The buyer is 
essentially able to affect auction prices through reducing his or her demand. Coordination among 
buyers may not be necessary.
1 (Related earlier studies are market power experiments in two-
sided auctions; e.g., Holt et al, 1986; Davis and Williams, 1991.) Bidder collusion involves 
explicit or implicit coordination among more than one bidders demanding single or multiple 
units of a homogeneous or heterogeneous goods, usually in an attempt to suppress price 
competition. (Earlier studies focus on successful or unsuccessful attempts of bidder collusion in 
single-unit auctions and double auction markets; e.g., Isaac and Walker, 1985; Isaac and Plott, 
1981; Clauser and Plott, 1993).  
 
Depending on the environment and institutional details, demand reduction and bidder collusion 
may occur under both ascending-price and sealed bid type markets. Here we focus on ascending 
auction institutions. Many researchers argue that, due to a richer action space and a superior 
information feedback that bidders get in the process of bidding in ascending auctions,  
these institutions have an advantage over the sealed bid procedures in solving complex allocation 
problems efficiently (such as allocation of airwave licenses; McAfee and McMillan, 1996).  
However, it is also well recognized that these very features of ascending auctions make them 
more susceptible to anti-competitive behavior (Milgrom, 1987; Cramton and Schwartz, 2000). 
The reason is two-fold. First, some anti-competitive outcomes may be supported as equilibria in 
the ascending auctions, but not in their sealed-bid analogs (Milgrom, 1987; Brusco and Lopomo, 
1999). Second, in cases where the same outcome may result from equilibrium play in both 
                                                 
• I thank Jeremy Dulatre for research assistantship. 
1 In other cases, several bidders need to coordinate on a demand reduction equilibrium, and distinction between 
demand reduction and collusion becomes less pronounced; see, e.g., Grimm and Engelmann (2001) discussed 
below.    - 2 - 
institutions, dynamic features of ascending auctions may allow bidders to learn their equilibrium 
strategies better.
2   
 
In this review we discuss whether experimental research on multi-unit auctions supports the 
above claims. The focus is on ascending price auctions; results on the sealed bids are mentioned 
only for comparison. Unless stated otherwise, we consider independent private value auctions. 
 
Experiments on demand reduction 
 
With the research extending from single-unit to multi-unit auctions, the first question was 
whether and when desirable efficiency properties of single-unit auctions generalize to multiple 
units. Vickrey (1961) provided an original theoretical insight that this is the case for the English 
and sealed bid uniform-price auctions as long as each bidder has use for at most one unit.  
McCabe et al. (1990) confirm, theoretically and experimentally, that with single-unit demands, 




Vickrey also made it clear that if bidders demand multiple units of the good, the strong incentive 
properties of single-unit English (and second price) auctions do not carry over to uniform-price 
multi-unit auctions: “It is not possible to consider a buyer wanting up to two units as merely an 
aggregation of two single-unit buyers: combining the two buyers into one introduces a built-in 
collusion and community of interest, and the bid offered for the second unit will be influenced by 
the possible effect of this bid on the price to be paid for the first, even under the first-rejected-bid 
method” (p. 27). This insight was later developed by theorists (Noussair, 1995; Ausubel and 
Cramton, 1996; Engelbert-Wiggans and Kahn, 1998) and tested by experimentalists, who 
confirmed that multi-unit uniform-price institutions create incentives for demand reduction. 
Uniform-price K-unit English clock (EC) and sealed bid (SB) auctions work as follows. In the 
EC auction, the price starts at zero and then increases by small increments; bidders report their 
quantities demanded at each price. The bidders are informed about the total demand at current 
price. The auction stops when there is no excess demand, and the uniform market-clearing price 
is then charged for every unit sold. In single-unit demand environments, each bidder has a 
dominant strategy to drop out of bidding once the price reaches his value; the outcome is 
therefore efficient with the price approximately equal to (K+1)st highest valuation. With multi-
unit demands, however, there may be incentives for bidders to reduce their demands, i.e., to drop 
out of bidding on lower-valued units early in order to buy higher-valued units at lower prices. In 
the SB auction, each subject submits sealed bids for every unit they wish to buy; K highest bids 
win the auction at the price equal to the highest rejected bid (or the lowest accepted bid). 
Similarly to the EC institution, the equilibria in the SB auctions under single-unit demands result 
in efficient allocations, whereas under multi-unit demands, there may exist strategic incentives to 
                                                 
2 Thus in single-unit auctions, ascending (English) and sealed bid second price auctions are strategically equivalent: 
it is a dominant strategy for bidders to bid according to their true value in both institutions. Yet, while observed 
behavior in English auctions closely conforms to the theory, overbidding is a persistent phenomenon in the second 
price auctions. A likely reason is that dynamic nature of the English auction makes the dominant strategy more 
transparent than in the second price auction (Davis and Holt, 1993; Kagel, 1995). 
3 See also Cox et al. (1984). McCabe et al. (1988) report that open outcry auctions for multiple units are not as well 
behaved as their English clock analogs due to “jump bidding.” Isaac and James (2000) confirm that strong incentive 
properties of the sealed bid Vickrey auctions hold in combinatorial auctions with multiple heterogeneous units.   - 3 - 




Alsemgeest et al. (1998) were the first to observe the demand reduction phenomenon in the 
experimental laboratory.
5 They conducted  multi-unit English clock (EC) auctions and sealed bid 
(SB) auctions with lowest-accepted-bid pricing, in both single-unit and two-unit demand 
environments, in markets with either six or three bidders. Alsemgeest et al. observed that 
whereas the outcomes of the EC under single-unit demands confirmed to the competitive 
prediction, there was a considerable amount of under-revelation under the two-unit demands: 
subjects attempted to influence prices by exiting the bidding process at prices below their 
valuations. Consequently, the EC generated less revenue under the two-unit demand than under 
the single-unit demand environment. Consistent with the theory, under-revelation most 
frequently occurred for the lower-valued unit in the two-unit demand environment. Interestingly, 
the authors observed no under-revelation in the two-unit demand environments in the SB 
auctions; the revenues and efficiencies in the SB were not significantly different between the 
single- and two-unit demand environments.
 6  
 
Kagel and Levin (2001a) further study demand reduction in uniform price EC and SB auctions. 
They employed a design which freed the environment of strategic uncertainty regarding other 
bidders’ behavior: In their two-unit auctions, a human subject with a flat demand for two units 
competed with a number of computer rivals with single-unit demands; the computer rivals were 
programmed to follow their dominant strategy of bidding according to their true value. The 
environment was chosen so that both EC and SB uniform price auctions yielded the same 
equilibrium prediction, with the human bidder bidding according to the true value on the first 
unit, and reducing demand to zero on the second unit. Kagel and Levin observe substantial 
demand reduction in both EC and SB auctions. However, similarly to earlier studies of single-
unit auctions (Kagel et al. 1987; Kagel and Levin, 1993), they find that the behavior in the EC is 
closer to the equilibrium prediction than in the SB; see figure 1, sessions 3 and 5. Additional 
variations on the EC and SB were then considered to study how the features of the English 
auction help bidders better learn the equilibrium strategies. The outcomes of these treatments
7 
allowed to conclude that “the closer conformity to equilibrium outcomes in the clock auctions 
results from both the information inherent in observing others’ drop out prices and the ability of 
the clock to provide this information in a highly salient way” (p. 414).  
                                                 
4 We illustrate incentives for demand reduction with the following complete information example. Suppose that a 
bidder in the EC uniform-price auction demands two units, which he values at 70 each, and his only competitor 
demands one unit, which she values at 50. Two units are offered for sale. Assume the bidder demanding a single unit 
bids according to her valuation, which is her dominant strategy. If the bidder demanding two units bids for both 
units, the auction stops with his competitor dropping out at the price of 50, and the bidder gains 40 in profits. 
However, he can do better by dropping out of bidding for the second unit at the very start of the auction; the auction 
then stops at the price of zero, yielding this bidder the profit of 70.  
5 Miller and Plott (1985) studied multi-unit demand uniform and discriminative price sealed bid auctions. Under 
their design, there was no incentives for demand reduction for bidders.  
6 Theoretical properties of the sealed bid uniform price auctions under multi-unit demands were unknown at the time 
the study was conducted.   
7 “Outcomes in the clock auction with no feedback are essentially the same as in the sealed bid auctions… Sealed 
bid auctions with the second highest computer value announced begin to approach behavior in the clock auctions 
with feedback once the environment is structured so that the information inherent in announcing the computer’s 
value is more salient” (p. 451).   - 4 - 
 
[FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE: From Kagel and Levin (2001a), figs 3, 6 and 8.] 
 
Kagel and Levin also compare the bidding behavior in the uniform price auction with the 
Ausubel,  or dynamic Vickrey, auction (Ausubel, 1997) designed to eliminate the demand 
reduction incentives. The latter auction works similarly to the EC ascending price auction, except 
winning bidders in the Vickrey auction do not pay a common price, but the price at which they 
have “clinched” an item (see Ausubel for details). Thus a bidder in the dynamic Vickrey auction 
cannot affect the price he pays for one unit by misrepresenting demand for another unit. In 
equilibrium, the auction results in full demand revelation and full efficiency. 
 
Kagel and Levin report that the dynamic Vickrey auction does eliminate demand reduction and 
thus improves efficiency as compared to uniform-price auctions (figure 1, session 9). However, 
they find that it raises less average revenue than the uniform price SB auctions, due to the 
bidders in the SB auction bidding less strategically than the theory predicts. They conclude that 
“there is a potential tradeoff between revenue and efficiency, unanticipated theoretically between 
the dynamic Vickrey auction and the uniform price sealed bid auction” (pp. 452-3). 
 
In a related paper, Kagel and Levin (2001b) investigate demand reduction incentives in multi-
unit demand uniform price EC and SB auctions in environments with synergies. They observe 
less demand reduction in the EC uniform price auctions in the environment with synergies than 
in the no-synergy environment, and also find that demand reduction decreases with an increased 
number of rivals. As in the previous study (Kagel and Levin, 2001a), the behavior is closer to the 
equilibrium play in the EC than in the SB auctions, but there is a large amount of out-of-
equilibrium behavior under both institutions. The EC in these experiments not only generate less 
revenue than SB auctions, but they are also no more efficient.  
 
Porter and Vragov (2000) compare Vickrey and uniform-price sealed bid (SB) with the English 
clock (EC) multi-unit auctions.
8 Unlike Kagel and Levin (2001a), they use a setting with two 
human bidders, each demanding two units, competing in a market with a total supply of two 
units. They also find that EC results in more demand reduction than other institutions. As an 
explanation, Porter and Vragov hypothesize that “the low information content in sealed bid 
auctions tempers the amount of demand reduction that actually occurs.”  
 
Grimm and Engelmann (2001) investigate a similar setting, where two human bidders with a flat 
demand for two units each compete in a market with a total supply of two units.  They compare 
five different multi-unit auction formats, including uniform EC and SB auctions, Ausubel 
auction, as well as sealed-bid Vickrey and discriminative auctions. An interesting feature of 
Grimm and Engelmann is that in their setting, the uniform price EC and SB auctions are 
characterized by multiple equilibria, including the truthful revelation, or the “incentive 
compatible” (IC) equilibrium which prescribes bidding according to the true value on both units, 
as well as the full demand reduction (DR) equilibrium, which prescribes reducing bidders’ 
                                                 
8 Porter and Vragov also test the robustness of the findings of List and Lucking-Reiley (2000), who compared 
demand reduction in uniform price sealed bid and Vickrey auctions in a field internet experiment. Their results are 
largely consistent with List and Lucking-Reiley.   - 5 - 
demands on the second unit down to zero.
9 Grimm and Engelmann report that three out of ten 
pairs in uniform EC auctions played almost the DR equilibrium strategy; in almost half of the 
cases bidders in the EC auctions acted in line with demand reduction incentives and dropped out 
of bidding on one unit immediately after the other bidder’s drop-out. Given that bidders in these 
experiments played ten auctions only and did not have much time to learn to coordinate on DR 
equilibrium, the amount of demand reduction appears to be quite substantial. Slightly less 
demand reduction was observed in the uniform SB auction, with the bids often being noisier and 
further away from equilibrium than in the EC auctions. Grimm and Engelmann also report that 
Ausubel auctions exhibited more truthful bidding and higher efficiency than any other 
institutions considered, although some demand reduction was observed in the Ausubel auctions 
as well.  
 
Manelli, Sefron and Wilner (2000) consider two mechanisms which, theoretically, are not 
subject to demand reduction incentives. They compare Vickrey and Ausubel mechanisms in a 3-
unit supply environment with 3 bidders, each demanding 2 units, in both private value and 
common value component environment. With private values, sincere bidding is an equilibrium in 
both mechanisms, and they should both yield, in theory, the same revenue and efficient 
allocations. Manelli et al. report that neither mechanism conforms to the theoretical predictions. 
There was significant overbidding on the first unit in both Vickrey and Ausubel auctions (with 
more overbidding in Vickrey), and some underbidding (demand reduction) on the second unit in 
Vickrey auctions.  Further, Ausubel auction exhibited another, unexpected, type of aggressive 
bidding. In the experiments, all bidders were allowed to demand up to three units, even though 
the third unit always had a value of zero. In Ausubel auctions bidders often bid for all three units 
until they secured the two units they desired; this sometimes led to a bidder acquiring all three 
units, leading to “too concentrated” allocations and therefore disturbing the efficiency. Manelli et 
al. note that while the amount of overbidding in Vickrey auctions was sensitive to small 
variations in the environment, aggressive over-demanding in Ausubel auctions persisted; in sum 
Vickrey auctions were always as efficient as Ausubel auctions, and yielded more or less revenue 
depending on the environment.  
 
Kagel et al. (2001) also compare multi-unit sealed-bid Vickrey with Ausubel (dynamic Vickrey) 
auctions, but in an environment with no strategic uncertainty. Unlike Manelli et al., they report 
that the Ausubel auction with drop out information comes significantly closer to sincere bidding 
than other institutions. It is then useful to compare the results of Manelli et al. with others’ 
findings on Ausubel auctions. Kagel and Levin (2001a) and Kagel et al. (2001) find that in 
environments where a single human subject competes with computer rivals, Ausubel auctions 
work well in terms of efficiency, outperforming other auction formats. Grimm and Engelmann 
also find that Ausubel auctions perform well in a setting where several human bidders interact 
but by design  are precluded from overly aggressive bidding.  On the other hand, Manelli et al. 
report that Ausubel auctions may suffer from efficiency losses caused by aggressive bidding, 
                                                 
9 Note that playing the DR equilibrium requires certain coordination between the two bidders, hence this setting 
comes very close to studies of bidder collusion. The differences between such DR equilibria and collusive equilibria 
(to be discussed below) are small. One distinction is that in the EC multi-unit settings usually employed to study 
demand reduction, only one bidder demanding multiple units may be left active at some point of the game; he then 
has a monopsony power and faces the exact DR incentives as discussed at the beginning of this section. In the open 
outcry-type auctions which are typically used to study collusion, activity rule restrictions are absent, and hence 
market power may be sustained only through continuous coordination among bidders in the auction (see below).    - 6 - 
which appears to be strategic in nature and therefore may be quite persistent. These results 
suggest that, at least in some environments, the presence of human rivals and strategic 
uncertainty associated with it may have significant effect on bidder behavior and therefore on 
performance characteristics of the Ausubel auction. 
 
What have we learnt? First, demand reduction is a well-documented phenomenon in the lab. 
Second, multi-unit uniform price ascending clock auctions exhibit demand-reduction behavior 
closest to equilibrium predictions as compared to corresponding sealed-bid institutions. Thus in 
uniform price clock auctions, the dynamic nature of the institution helps bidders to learn their 
equilibrium strategies better. Third, it may not be a universal phenomenon that dynamic multi-
unit auctions unambiguously result in outcomes closer to the theoretical predictions than their 
sealed-bid analogs. While the Ausubel (dynamic Vickrey) auction, designed to eliminate demand 
reduction incentives, performs well in some environments (as in Kagel and Levin and Grimm 
and Engelmann), it may become subject to new kinds of disequilibrium behavior in other settings 
(as in Manelli et al.), and lead to considerable efficiency losses.
10 These findings suggest that 
there is room for further research on multi-unit auction institutions that could eliminate demand-
reduction incentives and improve efficiency.   
 
Experiments on bidder collusion 
 
Until recently, the evidence of outright bidder collusion in auctions under standard experimental 
procedures without communication was scarce (Kagel, 1995). Multi-unit ascending auctions 
present new opportunities for bidders to collude that are non-existent in single-unit auctions or 
even multi-unit sealed bid auctions.
11 Burns (1985) observed some collusion attempts in multi-
unit sequential English auction with three bidders; yet collusion in her experiment was unstable 
and in the end all prices converged to competitive equilibrium.  A number of recent studies 
report sustainable collusion in ascending auctions. The issues being addressed are: possibility of 
collusion under “standard” procedures; role of various institutional details or auction formats in 
preventing or facilitating collusion; and the role of communication. All studies discussed here 
consider collusion in open outcry ascending bid auctions, or their computerized analogs; 
collusion in experimental English clock auctions (often used to study demand reduction, as 
discussed above) has been rarely reported.
12 
 
Sherstyuk (1999, 2001) studies the role of bid improvement rules for safe-guarding against 
collusion in multi-unit ascending bid auctions. If bid improvement rules are absent in an 
ascending auction, then bidders may sustain supra-competitive pricing as equilibria by matching 
each other’s low bids. Deviations are deterred by the threat to switch to competitive bidding, and 
in equilibrium objects are allocated to bidders randomly at a low price. Experimental design 
employed to test this prediction had three bidders in the market, each demanding a single unit, 
and a supply of two units. During the bidding process, the subjects were allowed to submit bids 
                                                 
10 Manelli et al. go as far as writing: “Just as theoretical properties of single-unit auctions do not always carry over 
to multi-unit environments in a simple way, so too behavioral regularities observed in single-unit environments do 
not always carry over to the multi-unit environment. For example, the transparency of sincere bidding in private 
value English auctions, that results in efficient allocations in laboratory environments, does not appear to be a 
characteristic shared by its multi-unit analogue.” 
11 Kawsnica (2000) studies bidder collusion in multi-unit sealed bid auctions with communication.  
12 Grimm and Engelmann (2001) is a notable exception; see footnote 9 above.   - 7 - 
no lower than the outstanding bid in the market; when the bidding was over, the two objects were 
allocated to two highest bidders, with ties in the bids of acceptance broken randomly. Explicit 
communication among bidders was not allowed. Sherstyuk reports persistent and mostly stable 
tacit collusion in such auctions, with occasional competitive outbreaks, first in a setting where all 
bidders had equal and commonly known valuation for the good (1999), and later in private value 
settings (2001).
13 In contrast, the sealed bid sessions conducted under identical supply and 
demand conditions converged to the competitive equilibrium. In the ascending auctions, bidders 
actively used the bid matching possibilities to communicate their intention to collude and to 
achieve and sustain collusive outcomes; figure 2 presents an example of such “bid matching” 
auction. However, some collusion was also observed in the standard ascending price auctions 
with no bid matches allowed, relying on the repeated nature of the auction (2001). This indicates 
that institutional features of ascending auctions allow highly motivated bidders to find ways to 
achieve and sustain tacit collusion that are inaccessible in the sealed bid auctions; collusion may 
take various forms, with bidders splitting markets either within periods (using bid matching), or 
across periods (using bid rotation schemes).  
 
[FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE: Based on Sherstyuk, 1999] 
 
Kwasnica and Sherstyuk (2001) provide the first systematic evidence of bidder collusion in 
simultaneous ascending price auctions under “standard” procedures without communication.
14 
There were two objects offered for sale in each auction period, and two or five of bidders, each 
demanding both objects. Each good was auctioned in a separate computerized ascending bid 
auction, with the auctions run simultaneously for both goods. Brusco and Lopomo (1999) show 
that there exist collusive equilibria in such auctions where bidders split the markets and secure 
objects to themselves, each in their “designated” market, at lower than competitive prices; such 
equilibria may be sustained even in the presence of large but common complementarities 
between objects. Kwasnica and Sherstyuk do observe a large amount of collusive behavior in 
two-bidder markets without complementarities and in the presence of moderate 
complementarities, especially among experienced bidders. Yet, markets with large 
complementarities were all competitive. As predicted by the theory, collusion never emerged in 
any of the five-person markets. Figure 3 illustrates the actual price dynamics in a 2-bidder 
market with no complementarities, 2-bidder market with large complementarity, and 5-bidder 
market with no complementarity.  
 
[FIGURE 3 AROUND HERE: Based on Kwasnica and Sherstyuk, 2001.] 
 
Kwasnica and Sherstyuk present an analysis of bidder behavior in these markets which sheds 
some light on how collusion was achieved and sustained. Two interesting features were 
characteristic to bidding in markets that resulted in low (collusive) prices. First, bidders in two-
person markets often signaled to each other with their bids to decide on how to split markets.
15  
                                                 
13McCabe et al. (1988) also noted that allowing for bid matches may lead to low price equilibria in some versions of 
multi-unit English auction. However, in their settings, the low price prediction was not supported by the 
experimental data (p. 57).  
14 The auction studied in this paper closely resembles the one used in practice by FCC to auction off airwave 
licenses. 
15 This is in line with theoretical predictions by Brusco and Lopomo.    - 8 - 
Signaling involved either placing an opening bid in their preferred market first, or placing a 
strictly higher initial bid in the preferred market. Second, retaliation in the sense of bidding high, 
and often above own values, was used to punish non-collusive behavior of others.
16 Further 
(similarly to Sherstyuk, 2001), they provide evidence that bidders were able to adopt various 
collusive schemes to maximize their gains from collusion. In particular, in treatments with 
complementarities, the predominant collusive scheme was bid rotation across periods, rather than 
splitting markets within a period; the former scheme allowed bidders to capture the 
complementarity term. 
 
Sherstyuk and Dulatre (2001) consider whether simultaneous ascending price auctions are more 
susceptible to collusion than sequential ones, as some theories predict. They study a setting with 
four bidders and four heterogeneous goods; explicit face-to-face communication was allowed 
between auction series to facilitate collusion. Curiously, Sherstyuk and Dulatre report that even 
with communication, in some markets collusion never emerged.
17 Further, collusive agreements 
took place more often in sequential than in simultaneous auctions. They conjecture that the 
reason was that sequential auctions were not as complex as the simultaneous ones, and 
advantages of collusion were easier to realize and learn under the former auction format. 
Sherstyuk and Dulatre further observe that the auction ending rules had a significant effect on 
bidder behavior. The “hard” closing rule led bidders in simultaneous auctions to focus on end-of 
-period bidding and possibly distracted the bidders’ attention away from collusion. Collusion 
was somewhat more frequent under the soft closing rule.  
 
Phillips et al. (2001) report on successful collusive practices in repeated sequential English 
auctions for homogeneous goods, in markets with two and six bidders.
18 Unlike in Sherstyuk and 
Dulatre, bidders in their design had identical downward sloping demands for the good, and the 
number of units offered for sale by the auctioneer was large enough to allow every bidder to buy 
most of their higher-valued units; thus the success of collusion may be due, to a large degree, to 
low competitive pressures from the market. An interesting finding they report is the absence of 
“high numbers effect” on collusion in auctions with communication (administered through 
email). Bidders in their six-person auctions were able to depress prices as effectively as in two-
person auctions. A possible reason, Phillips et al. suggest, is that in the six-buyer markets a 
sharing arrangement where each took a turn winning was focal; whereas in two-buyer markets 
there were too many discussions on how much the subjects were earning, which complicated 
coordination between bidders. Phillips et al. also find that in two-buyer markets, knowing the 
quantity of goods for sale alone was as an effective collusion-facilitating device as 
communication.  
 
In summary, the emerging experimental research on collusion in multi-unit ascending auctions 
clearly demonstrates that stable collusive outcomes can and do emerge under certain settings.  
                                                 
16 Kwasnica and Sherstyuk report that the about 20% of inexperienced bidders and over 30% of experienced bidders 
bid above their value at least twice during the experiment. In our knowledge, this is the first study where consistent 
overbidding is reported in private value ascending price pay-your-bid auctions.  
17 Archibald et al. (2001) report that collusion in some settings may be very hard to achieve except under a stringent 
set of procedures. They investigate posted-offer auctions in avoidable cost environments where collusion among 
firms is necessary to obtain efficiency.  
18 See also Menkhaus et al. (2001).    - 9 - 
Yet, collusion proves to be difficult in other settings. Ascending open auctions appear to be more 
susceptible to collusion than sealed bids. Many interesting issues are under-explored or not yet 
explored. First, while all studies discussed here consider collusion in open outcry type auctions, 
in many cases the vulnerability of these institutions to collusion may be remedied by adopting an 
ascending English clock procedure instead. English clock auctions may make collusion among 
bidders much harder to achieve due to coordination problems.
19 Second, many other institutional 
aspects of ascending auctions that may affect collusion need further investigation, such as: 
“activity rules” in simultaneous auctions, information feedback to bidders, knowledge of 
quantity supplied, communication. Other interesting issues include effects of eliminating 
repeated interaction with the same group of bidders; comparison between homogeneous and 
heterogeneous goods markets; effects of numbers; equilibrium selection in settings with multiple 
(collusive and competitive) equilibria; and behavioral foundations of collusion. Finally, one 
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 Figure 1: Human bidder behavior in auctions with 5 computerized rivals. Top: Uniform 
price sealed bid auction. Middle: uniform price clock auction. Bottom: Ausubel (dynamic 
Vickrey) auction. Source: Kagel and Levin (2001a), 2001 The Econometric Society.  
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8Figure 2: End-of-period bids (top) and bidding dynamics (bottom) 
in bid matching oral auction, session 2. In the absence of strict bid 
improvement rule, bidders used bid matches to suppress price 
competition. The prices averaged at 25.2 cents, compared with 
the competitive equilibrium prediction of 100 cents. Source: 
Constructed with data from Sherstyuk (1999).
Bidding dynamics in bid matching auction 
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Three bidders for two 
units typically results in 
tie bids below the 
competitive equilibriumFigure 3: Price dynamics for two objects in a 2-bidder market with no 
complementarity (top), 2-bidder market with large complementarity (middle), 
and 5-bidder market with no complementarity (bottom). "Bid" -- actual price; 
"CE price" -- competitive equilibrium price without complementarity; "Vprice" --
competitive (Vickrey) price with complementarity; "Collusive" -- collusive 
equilibrium prediction.  Source: Constructed with data from Kwasnica and 
Sherstyuk (2001). 



















































Closing bids are at competitive equilibrium
Closing bids are near collusive prediction
Closing bids converge to Vickrey competitive price